Presenter note: Quick recap — don't develop. The three-step algorithm: (1) Who is the parent? (2) Who exercises care? (3) Who pays? Today opens step 3. This is the last doctrinal class. Tuesday is review.

Presenter note: ~8 sections, ~35 slides total. The arc: a threshold principle (waiver) → the mechanical system (guidelines/deviations) → the enforcement failure (contempt/due process) → jurisdiction → close. The through-line: the system was designed to constrain judicial discretion on the front end, but it breaks down on the back end when the obligor can't pay.

Presenter note: This is directly tested on the exam. The principle: because the child is the beneficiary and is not a party to the parents' agreement, the parents lack authority to bargain away the child's right. Distinguish from spousal support — spouses CAN waive alimony (Simeone). The difference: alimony is the spouse's right; child support is the child's. A prenuptial or separation agreement purporting to waive child support is void as to that provision.

Presenter note: Students sometimes confuse this with the general rule that separation agreements are enforceable. They are — as to property division, alimony, and other adult claims. But child support provisions are always modifiable and never waivable. Even when a court incorporates a separation agreement into a decree, the child support term remains subject to modification based on changed circumstances. The waiver principle also explains why courts can order support even when neither parent requests it.

Presenter note: Casebook p. 900-901. The pattern was systemic — not individual bad judges, but a structural bias. The main cash assistance program (AFDC, later TANF) was designed to fill the gap, but Congress decided the gap shouldn't exist. The political logic: if noncustodial parents can be made to pay, the public fisc shouldn't bear the cost. This is Fineman's "privatized dependency" in action.

Presenter note: The 1988 Act is the key move. Before it, guidelines existed but were advisory. After it, the guideline amount is rebuttably presumed correct. A 1996 study showed 83% of orders were for the guideline amount — the system worked as designed. The remaining question is whether the guidelines themselves are set at the right levels. That's where the models come in.

Presenter note: Venohr excerpt, pp. 916-918. The three models reflect different policy judgments about the same question: what share of parental income does a child deserve? All three are "Continuity of Expenditures" models in some sense — they try to approximate what would have been spent on the child in an intact household. The critical variable is whether the custodial parent's income matters.

Presenter note: Example from the teaching manual: combined income $200,000; noncustodial parent earns $160,000 (80%). The noncustodial parent pays 80% of the guideline amount. The custodial parent's 20% is presumed spent directly. Key consequence: if the custodial parent gets a raise, the noncustodial parent's obligation DECREASES — because the custodial parent is now covering a larger share. Students should be able to identify this model from a fact pattern.

Presenter note: Step 1: gross income, not net — wages, salary, bonuses, rental income, pensions. Means-tested benefits (TANF, SSI) excluded. Some deductions allowed (e.g., prior child support obligations). Step 2: the guideline table is statutory — reflects what intact families typically spend on children at each income level. Step 3: proportional allocation is the core of the model — the custodial parent's share is presumed spent directly through in-kind care. Key consequence: if the custodial parent gets a raise, the noncustodial parent's obligation decreases.

<span class="highlight-q">The formula is mechanical. The fights are over inputs — what counts as income, whether to impute, how much parenting time actually occurred.</span> Presenter note: Step 4: childcare ($400) and health insurance ($150) are added on top of the base and split proportionally. Step 5: Kentucky requires roughly 73+ overnights for a parenting-time credit — equal time can reduce support significantly but usually not to zero. Step 6: only the noncustodial parent writes a check. The $1,011 is illustrative — actual tables differ by state and update periodically. Two doctrinal levers for edge cases: (a) imputed income — if a parent is voluntarily underemployed, the court assigns earning capacity; (b) parenting time and support are separate — no custody doesn't mean no obligation.

Presenter note: Nine states use this model. The advantage is administrative simplicity — one income, one percentage. The disadvantage is insensitivity to household-level economics. It also doesn't account for childcare or extraordinary medical expenses, which can dwarf other child-rearing costs. Some states using this model add childcare as a separate line item.

Presenter note: Only three states use Melson (Delaware, Hawaii, Montana). It's the only model that explicitly protects the obligor's self-sufficiency before allocating to the child. This matters for low-income obligors: under Income Shares or Percentage of Obligor, the guideline amount can exceed what the obligor needs to survive. Melson prevents that — but at the cost of complexity. Connect to Foohey: if guidelines that exceed ability to pay produce noncompliance, Melson's self-sufficiency floor might actually increase collections.

Presenter note: Transition to Turner v. Turner. The 85% statistic is from a 1996 study cited in the casebook at p. 901. The rebuttable presumption came from the 1988 federal mandate. The policy rationale: mandatory guidelines reduce litigation by making the outcome predictable. The written findings requirement serves the same function as Garska's primary caretaker checklist — it forces the court to show its work.

Presenter note: Two distinct issues on appeal. First: the parenting-time deviation lacked required findings. Second: the extracurricular apportionment was made outside the Worksheet framework. Both are procedural failures, not substantive disagreements — the court may have been right on the numbers, but it didn't follow the process. Unanimous opinion, Thompson writing.

Presenter note: The five-part test is statutory — OCGA § 19-6-15. The court applied a $434.66 parenting-time deviation but provided no written justification. The Georgia Supreme Court reversed — not because the deviation was wrong on the merits, but because the process was deficient. The message: deviations are permitted, but only through prescribed channels with prescribed justifications. This parallels the modification threshold in custody (Arnott) — the system demands gatekeeping before discretion operates.

Presenter note: The old practice — separate equitable apportionment of extracurriculars — was common pre-2008. The revised guidelines channeled all expenses through the Worksheet framework. The trial court used the old approach; the Supreme Court said the statute no longer permits it. Practical point: if the costs fit within the 7% threshold, they're already covered. If they exceed it, the court must treat the excess as a formal deviation.

Presenter note: This is a preservation-of-error point, not a substantive change. The deviation standard from Turner v. Turner is still good law — courts must still make the five findings. What changed: parties must raise the issue below or forfeit it. McCarthy disapproved Turner, Walls, and Eldridge on this narrow point. The teaching implication: the procedural rule matters for practitioners, but the substantive doctrine is unchanged.

Presenter note: Connect to the broader course theme: the custody system struggled with unstructured discretion (Painter). The child support system solved that problem with mandatory guidelines. But guidelines create a new problem — what happens at the margins (deviations) and at the back end (enforcement)? The next section addresses the back end.

Presenter note: Wage withholding is the workhorse — it catches income at the source. But it only works for obligors with formal employment. The other tools escalate: intercepts, then licenses, then contempt. Each step assumes the prior one failed. The question is what happens when ALL of them fail — not because the obligor is hiding income, but because there is no income to find.

Presenter note: Sources: $113-117B from OCSE certified arrears data (2020); 70% from casebook p. 968; 44% and 30% from Census CPS-CSS. The gap between "deadbeat" and "dead broke" is the central policy tension. The enforcement tools were designed in the 1990s for parents who had resources but evaded obligations. They were not designed for parents living in poverty. Turner v. Rogers is the case that forces the system to confront this gap.

Presenter note: Turner's statement to the judge is in the casebook at p. 966 — read it aloud if time permits. "I done meth, smoked pot and everything else... I just hope that you give me a chance." The judge's response: twelve months. No follow-up questions about ability to pay. No form. No finding. The contempt order's "ability to pay" section was left blank.

Presenter note: The blank finding is the dispositive fact. Civil contempt requires ability to comply — that's what distinguishes it from criminal contempt (which is punishment for past conduct). Hicks v. Feiock (1988): if the contemnor cannot comply, incarceration is punishment, not coercion, and criminal procedural protections attach. The judge skipped the threshold question entirely.

Presenter note: Not the Sixth Amendment — that applies only to criminal cases. Civil contempt is civil, so the question is what the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause requires. The Court applies the same Mathews framework used in Lassiter (Ch. 7, TPR proceedings). Students should recognize the framework from the TPR context. The question is whether the balance comes out differently here.

Presenter note: The Court cites Foucha v. Louisiana for the liberty interest language. The practical point: the ability-to-pay question is not a technicality. It is the dividing line between lawful civil contempt (coercing compliance) and unlawful punishment (jailing someone for being poor). If the court gets this question wrong, the consequence is incarceration of a person who has committed no crime and cannot do what the court demands.

Presenter note: The asymmetry point is the key to the holding. Rebecca Rogers was also unrepresented. Requiring a lawyer for Turner but not Rogers would "alter significantly the nature of the proceeding" — adding formality, delay, and potential for one-sided advocacy. The Court is weighing Turner's liberty interest against the custodial family's interest in swift enforcement. This is the same tension Gagnon v. Scarpelli identified in the probation revocation context.

Presenter note: The dissent's procedural objection: the safeguards framework was raised by the federal government as amicus, not by either party. Turner's own lawyer rejected the safeguards approach at oral argument, insisting on a categorical right to counsel. Thomas: the Court "transformed the case by vacating a state court judgment on an alternative constitutional ground advanced only by an amicus." Roberts and Alito joined Thomas on this procedural point and on the no-right-to-counsel holding, but did not join his originalist analysis.

Presenter note: These four safeguards are the operational holding. They come from the federal government's amicus brief, not from the parties. The Court: "if employed together, [these safeguards] can significantly reduce the risk of an erroneous deprivation of liberty." Emphasis on "together" — the Court does not say any single safeguard is sufficient alone. Turner's case: no notice, no form, no financial inquiry, blank finding. The judge skipped every step.

Presenter note: These reservations matter for practitioners. If the state is the creditor (IV-D enforcement cases), the holding's rationale weakens — the government has lawyers, so the asymmetry argument evaporates. If the custodial parent has a lawyer, same result. The Court was careful to limit its holding to the specific configuration before it: two unrepresented private parties. Students should recognize this as the Court leaving room for future development.

Presenter note: Connect to Lassiter (Ch. 7): same Mathews framework, same result — no categorical right to counsel in civil proceedings even when liberty is at stake. But different reasoning: in Lassiter, the opposing party was the state (TPR), and the Court still denied counsel. Here, the opposing party is an unrepresented private individual, which gave the Court an additional reason. The common thread: substitute safeguards can satisfy due process when the proceeding is civil and the critical question is factual rather than legal.

Presenter note: Brief — framework awareness, not deep doctrine. The 2008 UIFSA revision aligned with the 2007 Hague Convention on International Recovery of Child Support, ratified by the U.S. in 2016. UIFSA parallels UCCJEA for custody: both prioritize the home state and establish continuing exclusive jurisdiction. The practical effect: a noncustodial parent who moves to State B cannot seek a new (lower) order there if State A retains jurisdiction.

Presenter note: Example: Mother and child move from Arizona (issuing state) to California. Father stays in Arizona. Who has jurisdiction to modify? Arizona — because a party (father) still resides there. California cannot modify the order. If father also moves to California, Arizona loses continuing jurisdiction, and California can enter a new order. The one-order rule prevents forum shopping and eliminates the problem of conflicting obligations.

Presenter note: This is the master framework for the course. Every post-dissolution family law problem can be mapped onto these three steps. The final exam capstone (Class 28) will give students a fact pattern that requires all three. Step 1 determines standing. Step 2 allocates the child. Step 3 allocates the cost. Each step depends on the one before it.

Presenter note: The two halves were designed at different times for different problems. The front end (1984/1988) solved the discretion problem. The back end (1990s enforcement tools) solved the evasion problem. Neither was designed for the obligor who genuinely cannot pay — and that's where the system breaks down. The Foohey argument connects both: if front-end guidelines are set too high, back-end enforcement fails because noncompliance becomes the rational default.

Presenter note: Foohey (2009), casebook pp. 918-919. The insight is counterintuitive but empirically grounded: research shows that non-paying obligors would pay if the amounts were lower. Lowering obligations could increase the average amount of child support actually paid per child while only marginally decreasing what some individual children receive. This connects directly to Turner v. Rogers: the enforcement system's reliance on contempt presupposes an obligor who can pay but won't. When the obligor can't pay, contempt is both unjust and ineffective.

Presenter note: Close on the gap. Don't resolve it. The tension between the system's design assumptions and its operational reality is the unresolved question students should carry into the exam. Tuesday is review day — Class 28. Bring your questions and your two pages of notes. The capstone exercise will apply all three steps to a single fact pattern.

Presenter note: The capstone is a practice problem, not new doctrine. It integrates parentage (Ch. 9), custody (Ch. 10), and child support (Ch. 11) into a single fact pattern. Students should come prepared to walk through all three steps. Final exam: May 5, in-person, 3.5 hours, open book (textbook PDF + 2 pages personal notes).